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The Regulation of Armed Non-State Actors: Promoting the Application of the
Laws of War to Conflicts Involving National Liberation Movements
by Noelle Higgins*

he regulation of armed non-state actors is a challenge
to the state-centric international law paradigm. The vast
majority of international legal instruments which impact
the regulation of armed actors are open to ratification by states
only. This leads to the unfortunate situation in which armed nonstate actors often fall outside the remit of international law and
their use of force and, indeed, the use of force against them, is
left unregulated, which can only be to the detriment of combatants and civilians alike. However, there is an emerging trend,
led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Geneva
Call, to accommodate non-state actors under the international
humanitarian law (IHL) framework.
This article seeks to investigate how non-state actors, specifically national liberation movements, are and could be regulated
by IHL. It seeks to give an overview of the relevant legal provisions and illustrates the difficulties faced by national liberation
movements if they do wish to accede to IHL instruments and
apply IHL in their conflicts. As it is the aim of IHL to protect
both combatants and civilians in armed conflicts, it is important
that this body of law is practically applied and implemented in
all conflict situations to the greatest extent possible. However,
in the past, national liberation movements have encountered
difficulties when seeking to apply IHL to their conflicts due
to the nature of the legal framework and, indeed, the nature of
international law itself.
International law, the body of law that governs states in their
relationships with one another, generally struggles to accommodate non-state actors. The international legal instruments
dealing with the laws of war, namely the Geneva Conventions
of 1949,1 the Hague Regulations of 1907,2 and more modern
international conventions seeking to regulate weapons such as
the Ottawa Treaty of 1997 banning landmines,3 were all drafted
by states with the regulation of states in mind. These instruments
almost exclusively limit ratification to states and do not allow
for the accession of non-states. This means that non-state actors,
including national liberation movements, face many difficulties
when seeking to be bound by and apply IHL provisions in their
conflicts, thus limiting the protection available to those fighting
and caught up in these conflicts. However, non-state actors are
active in various theatres of war and it is therefore vital that a
realistic IHL framework that accommodates non-state actors be
formulated.

By Christopher Soghoian.

T

Introduction

POW registry at the Red Cross Museum in Geneva, Switzerland.

Wars of National Liberation
A war of national liberation can be defined as “the armed
struggle waged by a people through its liberation movement
against the established government to reach self-determination.”4 The right to self-determination has been enshrined in
conventional law in various legal provisions, such as Article 1
and Article 55 of the UN Charter,5 and Common Article 1 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights6 and
the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural
Rights.7 This right is also a jus cogens norm, binding on all
states, as recognized by the International Court of Justice.8
Nevertheless, because it is very difficult to implement, the right
of a people to self-determination often goes ignored or is denied.
In many cases this denial encourages the creation of national liberation movements and the outbreak of wars aimed at challenging governmental authority and achieving self-determination
through force.
The main spate of wars of national liberation occurred in
the mid-twentieth century; however, wars of national liberation did not vanish completely after the decolonization period.
In fact, according to the report Peace and Conflict 2008, 26
armed self-determination conflicts were ongoing as of late 2006,
including conflicts waged by groups representing the Palestinian
people, the Corsicans in France, and the Chechens in Russia.9
Additionally, in 2008 the South Ossetians, with support from
Russia, declared independence from Georgia after an armed
struggle.10
The application of IHL principles in these conflicts is vital
for the protection of both governmental and liberation movement combatants, and for civilians caught in the middle of a
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National liberation movements often seek to apply IHL
principles in their conflicts to legitimize their organization
and cause on the international stage. If they are seen
to act in accordance with international legal principles,
states may view these movements as genuine and valid
actors, rather than as “rebels” or “terrorists.”
accede to or accept to be bound by the Geneva Conventions,
thus applying the whole corpus of IHL to wars of national liberation. This liberal interpretation is not without its critics, who
argue that the drafters originally intended the term “Power” to be
restricted to mean states only.15
Attempts have been made by non-universally recognized
states, for example the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République
Algérienne (Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria)
and the State of Palestine,16 to accede to the Conventions and
the Additional Protocols.17 However, these attempts were unsuccessful as the Depositary housed in the Swiss government did
not accept the Parties’ notification of accession as they were not
recognized states.18 This illustrates that, even though the legal
framework could potentially accommodate national liberation
movements, political will is also needed in order to implement
IHL in wars of national liberation.

conflict zone. On a political level, national liberation movements
often seek to apply IHL principles in their conflicts to legitimize
their organization and cause on the international stage. If they
are seen to act in accordance with international legal principles,
states may view these movements as genuine and valid actors,
rather than as “rebels” or “terrorists.” Such a perceived status
change could ameliorate the plight of national liberation movements and the people they represent, for example by helping
them to receive international aid.
In recent times, actors in some self-determination conflicts
have attempted to apply IHL principles in their conflicts, outside
of the formal IHL framework. For example, since its foundation
in 2000, an NGO called Geneva Call has promoted the engagement of non-state armed groups with IHL. Through Geneva
Call, a number of national liberation movements from all parts
of the world, including the Polisario in the Western Sahara, the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, the Kurdistan
People’s Congress in Turkey, and the Kurdistan Regional
Government in Iraq, have agreed to implement IHL principles in
relation to the use of landmines.11 This break from the traditional
IHL framework is necessary because, as illustrated below, this
paradigm is state-centric, sidelining non-state actors.

Additional Protocol I
IHL was reviewed and revitalized by the adoption of two
Additional Protocols at the Diplomatic Conference for the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 1974–1977. Additional
Protocol I19 deals with international armed conflicts and
Additional Protocol II20 deals with non-international armed conflicts. These instruments have not been ratified by every state,
but some provisions have been deemed to be part of customary
law.21 As a result of international pressure during the decolonization period, wars of national liberation were determined to
be international armed conflicts and thus fall under Additional
Protocol I.22
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I identifies as international armed conflicts situations that “include armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of
their right of self-determination . . . .”23 The terms “colonial
domination,” “alien occupation,” and “racist regimes” are not
clarified in the instrument or elsewhere, but it is clear that they
reflect the politics of the decolonization period. It may therefore
be questioned whether Article 1(4) is applicable to modern
wars of national liberation.24 Some more recent national liberation movements, however, claim that their conflicts clearly fall
within the remit of Article 1(4). One example is the Free Aceh

IHL and Non-State Actors
Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, the main IHL instruments, are in principle open to ratification by states only. These
instruments have been almost universally ratified and have been
deemed to be part of customary law, thus binding on all states.12
They contain two provisions regarding accession or acceptance
that could be of use to national liberation movements and allow
for the application of the Conventions to wars of national liberation. The first provision is Common Article 60/59/139/155
regarding accession, which states that accession is open to any
“Power” rather than to any “State.”13 The second is Article 2(3),
which also refers to “Powers” rather than “States” as entities that
can be bound by the Geneva Conventions.14 If the terms “Power”
or “Powers” in these two provisions can be taken to encompass
national liberation movements, then these movements could
13
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for their accession to the instrument, but only when they follow
specific procedural requirements which limits the application of
the instrument. First, the prerequisites of Article 1(4) of Protocol
I must be satisfied. Then the authority representing the people
fighting for self-determination must make a Declaration to
the Depositary, which then must notify the other Parties to the
Geneva Conventions.36 The Declaration subsequently triggers
the application of the Conventions and Protocol.37

Article 96(3) Declarations
When Additional Protocol I was adopted, national liberation
movements welcomed Article 96(3) in principle as an attempt
to allow for their accession to an IHL instrument and for the
regulation of their wars as international armed conflicts. Since
then, a number of Article 96(3) Declarations have been made
by national liberation movements, such as the African National
Congress (ANC).38 However, no such Declarations are listed by
the Depositary39 or have been transmitted to the High Contracting
Parties.40 The Depositary will not accept Declarations made by
national liberation movements in states that have not ratified
Additional Protocol I, since such Declarations do not fulfill the
procedural requirements of Article 96(3). Some Declarations of
this kind, specifically mentioning Article 96(3), are nevertheless
deposited with the ICRC,41 indicating that national liberation
movements have recognized the difficulties inherent in Article
96(3) and tried to work outside the formal framework. There
is uncertainty regarding the legal status of such unilateral
Declarations. Verhoeven has commented that “it is accepted
that a declaration without deposition suffices”42 to trigger the
application of the Conventions and the Protocol, although this
assertion could be questioned in light of inconsistent practice.43
The Article 96(3) Declaration system is referred to in Article
7(4) of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects44 of 1980
(Certain Conventional Weapons or CCW). Under this provision,
in situations covered by Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol
I, an authority can make a Declaration to that Convention’s
Depositary, the Secretary General of the United Nations. This
would trigger the application of the Weapons Convention and
its Protocols as well as the Geneva Conventions, even in cases
where the state against which the authority is fighting has not

Saharawi troops in the Polisario Front.

Courtesy of Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Indonesia.

Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM)25 in the Acehnese
region of Indonesia, which claimed that Indonesia is a neocolonist.26 The GAM fought a war for self-determination and
independence from Indonesia for 25 years until it finally signed
a peace agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding,27 with
the Indonesian government in 2005, thereby giving up its claim
to independence. Alien occupation “covers the situation of a
territory which was not yet fully developed into a State before
it came occupied by another State”28 and could apply to places
such as the Western Sahara and events such as the Polisario’s
current war of national liberation. A claim of alien occupation
could perhaps also be made by groups representing the Kurdistan
People’s Congress and the Kurdistan Regional Government in
Turkey and Iraq. The category of “racist regime” is more difficult to satisfy in a current context. This term was originally
directed towards the apartheid regimes of South Africa and the
former Southern Rhodesia,29 which are no longer in existence.
The General Assembly also commented that Zionism was a
form of racism in Resolution 3379 (XXX) of 1957, but this was
voided by Resolution 46/86 of 1991.30
It is important to note that Article 1(4) states that international armed conflicts “include armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination . . . .”31 However, the Commentary on the
Additional Protocol ignores the word “include” and the drafters
stated that Article 1(4) “should be interpreted as introducing an
exhaustive list of cases which are considered to form part of the
situations covered by the preceding paragraph.”32
In short, it is clear that Article 1(4) has a restrictive scope,33
as it only applies to situations of armed struggle by a people
against colonial domination, alien occupation, or a racist regime.
A second criterion of Article 1(4) is that the struggle of that
people must be undertaken in order to exercise its right to selfdetermination against a Contracting Party to the Protocol. This
requirement further limits the scope of the provision, as the vast
majority of states faced with such a struggle, such as Indonesia
and India,34 have not ratified Additional Protocol I, thereby rendering the protection offered by the instrument useless for many
liberation movements.
Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol I,35 discussed further
below, accommodates national liberation movements and allows

Women soldiers of the Free Aceh Movement.
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States almost always refuse to recognize the existence
of national liberation movements and prefer to refer to
groups who use force to challenge their authority as
“rebels” or “terrorists” who fall outside the remit of
IHL. Members of the Irish Republican Army who
fought for the independence of Ireland from the United
Kingdom called for many years for their members who
had been imprisoned to be granted prisoner of war
status; however, they were viewed only as “terrorists”
and dealt with under domestic legislation.
ratified Additional Protocol I.45 However, no Declarations of this
kind have been made.46 The fact that national liberation movements have not utilized this mechanism may mean that these
movements have become disillusioned with the formal IHL
framework and the problems associated with accession to other
IHL instruments. It may also mean that information on the CCW
mechanism has not been widely disseminated among national
liberation movements. Dissemination of IHL rules is the first
step towards application and is an issue which deserves attention. Engagement with non-state actors is needed for adequate
explanation of IHL principles to take place.

also agree to the monitoring and verification of these commit
ments by Geneva Call. Under the Deed, signatories also agree
“to treat their commitment as one step or part of a broader commitment in principle to the ideal of humanitarian norms,”50 thus
binding themselves in the most formal way possible within the
current IHL framework. So far, 39 armed groups51 have signed
Deeds of Commitment, a move that a number of states view as
a positive development.52

National Liberation Movements, States, and IHL
It is obvious that national liberation movements will be met
with obstacles to their accession to the Geneva Conventions
as they are not states.53 However, that does not stop them
from declaring their intention to apply and be bound by these
Conventions outside of the formal legal framework.54 For example, the ANC made a statement to the ICRC in 1980 regarding
its willingness to apply the Conventions, as did South West
Africa People’s Organisation, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic.55
In addition, since the outbreak of many wars of national
liberation in the 1970s, numerous liberation movements have
actively implemented IHL principles, especially in relation to
prisoners of war. Some national liberation movements have
invited the ICRC to visit their prisoner camps and to oversee their implementation of IHL rules. The ICRC has visited
prisoners of war held by the various national liberation movements such as the Polisario Front,56 the National Front for the
Liberation of Chad,57 and the SPLM/A58 to monitor their treatment of prisoners and application of IHL. The ICRC has also
encouraged dialogue between state leaders and national liberation movements. For example, the president of the ICRC has met
with President Al Bashir of Sudan and also with the chairman of
the SPLM/A, John Garang de Mabior. During these meetings,

Geneva Call and the Deed of Commitment
Very important and innovative work to engage with and to
accommodate non-state actors and to encourage their willingness
to apply IHL has been undertaken by Geneva Call since 2000.
Geneva Call is a “neutral and impartial humanitarian organisation dedicated to engaging armed non-State actors towards
compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law
and human rights law.”47 It has accommodated the desire of
non-state actors to bind themselves by IHL rules regarding land
mines, through the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on their Destruction of 199748 (Ottawa Treaty). This is done
by means of signing a Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a
Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine
Action,49 formulated and overseen by Geneva Call.
Although landmines are a popular weapon of non-state
actors, the Ottawa Treaty limits ratification to states only and
the use of these weapons by non-state actors cannot be formally
regulated under the current IHL framework. By signing a Deed
of Commitment, however, armed non-state actors agree to a
number of commitments in relation to the non-use of mines and
15
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ued.”64 These are rare examples of state acknowledgement of
application of IHL norms to internal conflicts, as states tend to
favor territorial integrity over humanitarian concerns.65
The fact that national liberation movements have invited the
ICRC to overview their implementation of IHL principles in
prisoner of war camps, have signed Deeds of Commitment to
the Ottawa Treaty and restricted their use of landmines, and have
been open to dialogue on IHL principles and processes with
NGOs and states, illustrates their wish to be accommodated in
the formal IHL framework. Currently, due to the state-centric
nature of IHL, the adhesion of national liberation movements to
this body of law is ad hoc and unpredictable. An IHL framework
which formally engages these movements is needed.

the ICRC president made known the ICRC’s readiness to facilitate the release of detainees held by the SPLM/A.59
While national liberation movements have been willing to
apply and to declare their intentions to apply IHL in an effort
to “internationalize” and legitimize their struggles, states generally refrain from applying any IHL provisions for fear that
they may be in some way legitimizing the national liberation
movement and thus the challenge to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.60 States almost always refuse to recognize the
existence of national liberation movements and prefer to refer
to groups who use force to challenge their authority as “rebels”
or “terrorists” who fall outside the remit of IHL. Members of
the Irish Republican Army who fought for the independence of
Ireland from the United Kingdom called for many years for their
members who had been imprisoned to be granted prisoner of war
status; however, they were viewed only as “terrorists” and dealt
with under domestic legislation.61 Similarly, the Indonesian
government insisted for many years on officially calling the
GAM a “peace disturbing gang” (gerombolan pengacau keamananan),62 thereby denying its national liberation movement
status, and applied domestic criminal law when dealing with
GAM members.
Only very rarely, when violence and fighting have reached
high levels, have states accepted that IHL applied to a war of
national liberation and affirmatively applied Common Article
3, the most basic of all IHL provisions. For example, beginning
in 1974, Portugal applied Common Article 3 to the conflicts in
its colonies in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique and
invited the ICRC to visit its prisoners of war.63 France also
applied the provision to the Algerian War in 1956, “partially
because the FLN [National Liberation Front of Algeria] threatened reprisals if executions of captured FLN members contin-

Conclusions and Recommendations
Given the major difficulties that national liberation movements have faced when attempting to bind themselves by IHL,
the work of organizations such as Geneva Call should be welcomed. This work should also be expanded to include other IHL
conventions. In addition, dialogue between states and non-state
actors, as well as with international organizations, on issues
of IHL should be encouraged to reflect the reality of current
conflicts, which are rarely waged between two or more states.
Attempts should be made to convince states that the application
of IHL to a conflict does not necessarily translate into a threat
to their territorial integrity. It is important that the benefits of
the application of IHL and, indeed, the consequences of noncompliance under international criminal law be highlighted.
Such steps may encourage the political will necessary for the
implementation of the IHL regime in wars of national liberation,
which can only be to the benefit of all involved in the conflict.
HRB
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